Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2012

Super PACs
Richard Briffault
Columbia Law School, brfflt@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard Briffault, Super PACs, MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW, VOL. 96, P. 1644, 2012; COLUMBIA PUBLIC LAW
RESEARCH PAPER NO. 12-298 (2012).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1741

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

Columbia Law School
Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group

Paper Number 12-298

Super PACs

Richard Briffault
Columbia Law School

April 16, 2012

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2040941

SUPER PACs April

4/15/2012 4:18 PM

Article

Super PACs
Richard Briffault†
INTRODUCTION
The most striking campaign finance development since the
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission1 in January 2010 has not been an upsurge in corporate and union spending, as might have been expected from a
decision striking down the decades-old laws barring such expenditures. Instead, federal election campaigns have been
marked by the emergence of an entirely new campaign vehicle,
which uses——but is not primarily dependent on——corporate
or union funds, and which threatens to upend the federal campaign regulatory regime in place since 1974.
The 2010 election cycle witnessed the birth of the “Super
PAC”— a political action committee legally entitled to raise donations in unlimited amounts. Non-existent and probably illegal before the spring of 2010, Super PACs spent an estimated
$65 million on independent expenditures in 2010, and were
significant players in more than a dozen Senate and House races.2 By early 2012, Super PACs were already major partici† Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law
School. Copyright © 2012 by Richard Briffault.
1. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2. The Center for Responsive Politics estimated total Super PAC independent expenditures in the 2010 election cycle at $65.3 million. See Ctr. for
Responsive Politics, 2010 Outside Spending, by Super PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Feb. 29, 2012), [hereinafter 2010 Outside Spending] http://
www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2010&chrt=V&disp=O
&type=S (adding the “Independent Expenditures” column equals approximately $65.33 million). The Congressional Research Service found that Super PACs
spent $90.4 million in 2010, with about seventy percent of that, or approximately $63 million, devoted to independent spending and the rest spent on
administrative costs. See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42042,
“SUPER PACS” IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS
13 (2011). Super PAC spending exceeded ten percent of total candidate spending in sixteen Senate and House elections. Id. at 19–20.
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pants in the 2011–2012 election cycle, significantly outspending
the candidates in the early Republican presidential nominating
contests.3 Some Super PACs spent millions of dollars on Senate
general election contests that were more than ten months
away.4 Although some Super PAC funds come from corporations and unions, the vast majority have been provided by
wealthy individuals who, well before Citizens United, were
permitted to spend unlimited sums independently, but were
subject to a federal statutory limit of $5000 on the amounts
they could give to the federal PACs that expressly support or
oppose federal candidates.5 Citizens United did not address the
statutory limits on individual donations to PACs. The Court’s
overruling of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce6 and
the pertinent part of McConnell v. FEC7 focused on the constitutional status of corporate campaign participation and the
protection of independent spending, not on the rules governing
contributions to political committees.8 The authorization of Super PACs followed directly from lower court decisions, including two that predated Citizens United, and advisory opinions of
the Federal Election Commission (FEC). But Citizens United—
particularly the Supreme Court’s flat assertion that independent expenditures, whatever their actual effect on the political
process, raise no danger of corruption or the appearance of corruption9 within the meaning of Buckley v. Valeo10 —provided
crucial doctrinal support for the legal actions that launched
3. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Super PACs Outspend Campaigns 2 to 1 in S.C.,
WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2012, at A6.
4. See, e.g., Tom Hamburger & Melanie Mason, ‘Super PACs’ Show Power, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2012, at A1 (“In Ohio, $3 million in ads . . . have already been aired against the state’s incumbent Democratic senator, Sherrod
Brown—a year before the election.”); Manu Raju, Scott Brown, Elizabeth Warren Call for Super PAC Cease-Fire, POLITICO (Jan. 16, 2012, 1:42 PM), http://
www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71484.html (reporting that, as of early
January 2012, Super PACs had spent at least $3.5 million on the November
2012 Massachusetts United States Senate race).
5. See Fredreka Schouten et al., Individuals, Not Corporations, Drive
Super PAC Financing, USA TODAY, Feb. 9, 2012, at A7 (“Nearly two-thirds of
the $95 million that flowed into super PACs driving presidential and congressional politics came from wealthy individuals . . . .”); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(1)(C)
(limit on individual donations to a regular, non-Super PAC is $5000 per calendar year).
6. 494 U.S. 652 (1990) ( per curiam).
7. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
8. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899–913 (2010).
9. Id. at 908–11.
10. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Super PACs and enabled them to flourish. The rise of Super
PACs indicates that the real impact of Citizens United may be
the re-validation of the unlimited use of private wealth in elections, not just spending by corporations and unions.
This Article considers the emergence of Super PACs and
their implications for the future of American campaign finance
law. Part I explains what a Super PAC is and how it differs
from other campaign finance vehicles. Part II analyzes the law
of Super PACs, including the doctrinal tension out of which
they emerged and the court and agency decisions authorizing
their existence and operations. Part III examines the place of
Super PACs in the campaign finance system, particularly their
role in the 2010 congressional elections and their potential impact on the 2012 races based on fundraising and spending as of
early 2012. In their brief life span, Super PACs have already
begun to evolve from general ideological or partisan committees
to vehicles for advancing or opposing the fortunes of specific
candidates. This threatens to obliterate the significance of the
limits on contributions to candidates that have been a centerpiece to federal campaign finance regulation since the postWatergate reforms enacted in 1974. Part IV concludes by considering the implications of Super PACs for the future of American campaign finance law.
I. WHAT IS A SUPER PAC AND HOW DOES IT DIFFER
FROM OTHER CAMPAIGN FINANCE ACTORS?
A Super PAC is a political committee, registered with the
FEC, and subject to the federal organizational, registration, reporting, and disclosure requirements that apply to other political committees.11 A Super PAC makes independent expenditures expressly supporting or opposing candidates for federal
office, but does not make any contributions to federal candidates.12 Indeed, it is often formally referred to as an “independ11. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 432–34 (2006 & Supp. IV 2006) (codifying “political
committees”).
12. See GARRETT, supra note 2, at 3 (defining a Super PAC). As a result of
a federal district court order, the FEC has also authorized so-called “hybrid
PACs” that can both accept unlimited donations to finance independent expenditures and accept contributions, subject to the restrictions that ordinarily
apply to contributions to PACs, to be used to make contributions to candidates. A hybrid PAC must keep the funds for its contributions and independent spending separate, but it can operate as a Super PAC with respect to its
independent spending and as an ordinary PAC with respect to its contributions. See TAN & nn 157-164, infra.
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ent expenditure committee” or an “independent expenditureonly PAC.”13 An ordinary, non-Super PAC can both make contributions to candidates and engage in independent spending
that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office, whereas a Super PAC can only make independent expenditures and is barred from making
direct candidate contributions.14 The very silver lining to the
dark cloud of inability to contribute is that the rules limiting
contributions to ordinary PACs do not apply to Super PACs.15
Federal law limits an individual’s contribution to a PAC to
$5000 per year;16 corporations and unions cannot donate treasury funds to a PAC, although a corporation or union can create
its own PAC and use treasury funds to pay for the PAC’s administrative costs and to solicit individual contributions to the
PAC from people affiliated with the corporation or union.17 But
there are no restrictions on the size of donations to Super PACs
and no prohibition on the contribution of corporate or union
treasury funds.18 Both PACs and Super PACs can engage in
unlimited amounts of independent spending. But only Super
PACs can fund that unlimited spending by collecting unlimited
amounts in contributions from individuals, corporations, and
unions. This gives the Super PAC the capacity to raise and
spend far more money than the standard PAC.
Super PACs are related to, but distinguishable from, two
13. Technically, the term “political action committee” or “PAC” does not
exist under federal law. The law recognizes and regulates a “political committee,” which is defined as any committee, club, association, or other group of
persons that receives contributions in excess of $1000 or makes expenditures
in excess of $1000 in a calendar year to influence elections for federal office. 2
U.S.C. § 431(4)(A). Political committees also include the “separate, segregated
fund[s]” created by corporations and unions—which are barred from using
their treasury funds to contribute to candidates under 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a)—to
make contributions in federal elections. Id. §§ 431(4)(B), 441b. Because the
first committee created by a labor union in the 1940s to get around the restriction on direct union support for federal candidates was called the Political
Action Committee, political committees have long been known as PACs. Anthony Corrado, Money and Politics: A History of Campaign Finance Law, in
THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 7, 18 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds.,
2005).
14. GARRETT, supra note 2, at 3. As explained in note 12, supra, there are
also hybrid PACs that can both make contributions to candidates, with funds
subject to federal contribution restrictions, and undertake independent spending with funds not subject to contribution restrictions.
15. Id.
16. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C).
17. Id. § 441b.
18. GARRETT, supra note 2, at 3–6.
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other independent spending vehicles that have loomed large in
recent elections—section 527 committees and section 501(c) organizations. Both “527” and “501(c)” refer to provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code. Section 527 is the provision of the Code
that exempts from federal income taxation contributions given
to organizations operating primarily to influence elections to
the extent that the contributions are used for electoral purposes.19 Although technically all political committees are 527 organizations for tax purposes, the term is generally used to describe so-called “outside” committees— that is, committees
other than candidate, party, or political action committees—
that participate in elections.20 Although for tax purposes these
outside 527s are electoral organizations, they are not “political
committees” within the meaning of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).21 Therefore, they need not register with the
FEC and abide by other FECA requirements and restrictions as
long as they avoid engaging in campaign communications that
involve “express advocacy,”22 that is, expressly calling for the
election or defeat of clearly identified federal candidates.23 527s
are required by the Internal Revenue Code to publicly disclose
donors who give more than $200—the same threshold FECA
applies to political committees24—but the 527 disclosure is enforced by the IRS, not the FEC.25 Like Super PACs, 527s are
not subject to FECA’s dollar limits and source restrictions on
contributions to FEC political committees, and there are no
limits on how much they can spend.26
Unlike 527s, section 501(c) organizations—particularly
those covered by 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) of the tax code—are
not primarily electoral. Instead they are civic leagues and social welfare organizations ((c)(4)s), labor unions ((c)(5)s), and
trade associations and chambers of commerce ((c)(6)s).27 These
entities may engage in political activity to advance their public
19. See generally Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem . . . and the Buckley
Problem, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 949 (2005) (providing a basic overview of
527s).
20. See id. at 954 (“[T]he 527s are not parties, and they do not have the
same relationship to candidates that the parties enjoy.”).
21. Id. at 951–52.
22. See id. at 955–60.
23. Id.
24. 2 U.S.C. § 434( b)(3)(F ) (2006).
25. I.R.C. §§ 527( j)(2)(B), 6104(a)(1)(A) (2006).
26. Briffault, supra note 19, at 950–51.
27. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)–(6).
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policy goals and may even enter the electoral arena, as long as
that is not their primary purpose and political spending is not
their primary expense.28 They can spend without limit on election-related activity, including electioneering communications,
so long as electoral spending is less than half of their total
spending within a year.29 They are also exempt from any FECA
restrictions on the donations they receive.30 501(c)’s are required to disclose information to the IRS about donors who give
$5000 or more in a single year, but this information is not made
public.31 FEC disclosure applies to 501(c) contributors only if
the contributor specifically earmarks her contribution for federal electioneering communications or express advocacy.32
Thus, all three types or organizations—Super PACs, 527s,
and 501(c)s—may engage in election-related spending without
dollar limits and accept contributions to pay for that spending
from individuals, corporations, and unions without dollar limits. Super PACs are subject to FECA disclosure of their donors,
and 527s are subject to IRS disclosure of their donors, while
501(c)s are not required to publicly disclose their donors at
all.33 527 committees have to eschew express advocacy in order
to avoid being regulated as FEC political committees, and
501(c)s must limit their electoral spending to less than half
their total spending in an annual period.34 Super PACs, however, can devote all their spending to electioneering and engage in
28. See Miriam Galston, When Statutory Regimes Collide: Will Citizens
United and Wisconsin Right to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of Campaign Activity Unconstitutional?, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 867, 876 n.29 (describing the “primarily” standard of organizational purpose under § 501(c)) (2011).
29. Id.
30. The Supreme Court has held that FECA applies only to “organizations
that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the
nomination or election of a candidate.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976).
By definition, 501(c) groups cannot have a political primary or main purpose.
Galston, supra note 28, at 876 n.29.
31. See I.R.C. §§ 6033, 6104.
32. See 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9) (disclosure of contributors who fund electioneering communication), 11 C.F.R. § 109.10(e)(1)(vi) (disclosure of contributors who fund independent expenditures). On March 30, 2012, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment
to the plaintiffs in a suit brought to challenge the requirement that a corporation or union that engages in electioneering communications subject to federal
reporting requirements need disclose only those donors above a threshold level
who earmarked their donations for the purpose of furthering electioneering
communications. Van Hollen v. FEC, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2012 WL 1066717,
D.D.C., Mar.. 30, 2012, (No. CIV A 11-0766 (ABJ).
33. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 432–34 (2006); I.R.C. §§ 527( j)(2)(B), 6033, 6104.
34. See supra notes 22–23, 30–32 and accompanying text.
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express advocacy.35 The trade-off for their greater freedom to
spend is that they are subject to FECA’s more stringent disclosure requirements.36
Despite these formal legal differences, these organizations
are often closely connected. One interest group can sponsor a
527, a 501(c), a Super PAC, and an ordinary PAC. The largest
Super PAC in 2010, American Crossroads, was linked to a
prominent 501(c)(4), American Crossroads Grassroots Political
Strategies.37 Although each entity must abide by a particular
set of rules, enjoys distinct opportunities, and is subject to different restraints, these groups can operate as political networks rather than as isolated organizations.38 Donors who prefer anonymity can take advantage of a 501(c)(4)’s exemption
from public disclosure, although as we shall see donors have also found ways to give to Super PACs and avoid disclosure. On
the other hand, donors who are less concerned about disclosure
and who do not want the committee they are funding to have to
watch its words or worry about maintaining its 501(c) tax status can now give unlimited financial support to a Super PAC.
According to former FEC Chairman Michael Toner, Super
PACs have “effectively replac[ed]” 527 organizations because of
their ability to engage in express advocacy.39
II. THE LAW OF SUPER PACS
A. BACKGROUND: THE DOCTRINAL DIFFICULTY
Super PACs emerged out of the tension at the heart of the
central holding in the Supreme Court’s foundational campaign
finance decision, Buckley v. Valeo.40 In Buckley, the Court held
35. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
37. See Peter Overby, Powerful GOP-Linked SuperPAC Has Clear Agenda,
NPR.ORG (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/02/09/146613016/powerful
-gop-linked-superpac-has-clear-agenda (“The superPAC American Crossroads
works with a partner, a nonprofit ‘issues’ group called Crossroads GPS, which
[American Crossroads CEO Stephen] Law also runs.”).
38. See Jessica Yellin, Crossroads’ $51 Million Haul, CNN (Jan. 31, 2012),
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/01/31/crossroads-51-million-haul/
(“Together American Crossroads and Crossroads GPS raised $51 million in
2011 . . . . American Crossroads the super PAC raised $18.4 million and Crossroads GPS raised $32.6 million.”).
39. Michael E. Toner et al., What Is a Super PAC?, ELECTION L. NEWS
(Wiley Rein LLP, Wash. D.C.), Sept. 2011, at 7, available at http://www
.wileyrein.com/publications.cfm?sp=articles&newsletter=8&id=7458.
40. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) ( per curiam).
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that the First Amendment permits limits on campaign finance
activities in order to prevent corruption or the appearance of
corruption.41 Contributions to candidates can be limited because a large contribution raises the danger “of a political quid
pro quo” and “public awareness of the opportunities for abuse
inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions”
undermines confidence in our system of government.42 So, too,
contributions to organizations that make contributions to candidates, and expenditures that such organizations coordinate
with the candidates they support, can be limited to prevent circumvention of the limit on direct contributions to candidates.43
On the other hand, Buckley determined that candidate expenditures and independent expenditures—that is, expenditures on
campaign activities by individuals and groups not affiliated
with a candidate but supporting or opposing a candidate—may
not be limited.44 Buckley held that limiting independent expenditures “heavily burdens core First Amendment expression,” which could not be justified by the anti-corruption interest that sustains contribution limits.45 In so ruling, the Court’s
reasoning was at least partially empirical. The Court assumed
that:
[u]nlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate’s campaign and indeed may
prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo
for improper commitments from the candidate.46

Buckley flatly rejected the idea that any “governmental interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and
groups to influence the outcome of elections” could support a
limit on independent spending.47 With equality not a permissible justification for limiting independent spending and the anticorruption concern that justified limits on contributions not
available to support limits on independent spending, Buckley
held that independent spending could not be subject to limits.
41. Id. at 26–30.
42. Id. at 26–27.
43. Id. at 46 n.53.
44. Id. at 44 –45, 51–54.
45. Id. at 47–48.
46. Id. at 47.
47. Id. at 48–49 (rejecting the equalization argument on First Amendment grounds).
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But what about contributions to organizations that engage
in independent spending? Can those contributions be limited?
Buckley upheld FECA’s limit on individual donations to candidates,48 its limit on donations by political committees to candidates,49 and its aggregate limit on all contributions an individual can make to candidates and political committees in a calendar
year.50 But it did not specifically address FECA’s $5000-per-year
cap on individual donations to political committees.
Arguably, the Court implicitly addressed and resolved the
question when it upheld FECA’s aggregate limit on all individual donations to federal election committees, which was
$25,000 per year when Buckley was decided51 and is now
$117,000 per biennial election cycle.52 The Court found that the
aggregate limit was necessary to prevent evasion of the monetary cap on individual donations to candidates “by a person who
might otherwise contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through the use of unearmarked political contributions to political committees likely to contribute to that
candidate, or huge contributions to the candidate’s political
party.”53 But the Court’s analysis appears to assume that donations to political committees could be limited because such
committees function as conduits passing along the donations to
candidates or because of the close association between a candidate and his political party.54 Buckley left open whether a limit
could be imposed on donations to committees that are not parties or conduits but make only independent expenditures.
That question was affected, but not clearly resolved, by
several other Supreme Court decisions in the years before Citizens United. Five years after Buckley, in California Medical
Ass’n v. FEC (CalMed), the Court upheld the application of
FECA’s limit on contributions to a political committee in a case

48. Id. at 23–35.
49. Id. at 35–36.
50. Id. at 38.
51. See id. at 38 (discussing the $25,000 limit on total contributions in a
calendar year).
52. See Contributions, FEC (Feb. 2011), http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/
contrib.shtml ( listing the current federal campaign contribution limits).
53. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38.
54. See id. (explaining that the cap on total contributions stops contributors from avoiding the cap on contributions to candidates by giving to political
committees which can then use that money to support the contributor’s chosen
candidates).
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involving donations by a trade association to its own PAC.55
Although there would seem to be little danger that an organization could corrupt its own PAC, the Court’s plurality opinion
by Justice Marshall emphasized that the limit on donations to
political committees prevented circumvention of the limit on direct contributions to candidates.56 The key fifth vote came from
Justice Blackmun who, in a concurring opinion, agreed that the
limit could be upheld “as a means of preventing evasion of the
limitations on contributions to a candidate.”57 Justice
Blackmun, however, went on to suggest that “a different result
would follow” if the donation cap “were applied to contributions
to a political committee established for the purpose of making
independent expenditures, rather than contributions to candidates,” because “a committee that makes only independent expenditures poses no . . . threat” of corruption or the appearance
of corruption.58
Technically dictum, Justice Blackmun’s CalMed concurrence was bolstered by a second decision later that year, Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley (CARC), in which
the Court invalidated a municipal ordinance capping contributions to committees formed to support or oppose ballot propositions.59 The Court had previously found that ballot-proposition
elections pose no danger of corruption as they do not involve
the election of a candidate, so that spending in support of or
opposition to ballot questions could not be limited.60 As a result,
the Court in CARC concluded there was no anti-corruption justification for the “significant restraint on the freedom of expression of groups and those individuals who wish to express their
views through committees.”61
Justice Blackmun’s concurring dictum in CalMed and the
Court’s CARC decision together indicate there is no constitutional basis for limiting contributions to an organization if neither the contribution itself nor the activity it is funding poses a
danger of corruption. But when does a contribution or expenditure pose a sufficient danger of corruption that it may be regu55. 453 U.S. 182, 184 –86, 201 (1981).
56. Id. at 197–99.
57. Id. at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
58. Id.
59. 454 U.S. 290, 291, 300 (1981).
60. See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978) (noting that
the risk of corruption present in candidate elections does not exist in issue
elections).
61. CARC, 454 U.S. at 299.
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lated? Although Buckley likened corruption to the danger that
“large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro
quo,” the Court stressed the risk of corruption even in arrangements that do not amount to a bribe.62 Rather, the possibility of corruption extends beyond “blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental
action.”63 In a later case, the Court emphasized that the corruption concern “extend[s] to the broader threat from politicians
too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”64
The Court’s conception of the nature of the “corruption”
that could justify restriction was dramatically expended in
2003 in McConnell v. FEC, which upheld the soft money restrictions Congress imposed in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”).65 Soft money consisted of donations
by wealthy individuals that were dramatically greater than the
dollar limitations applicable to individual donations to candidates and contributions by corporations and unions, notwithstanding the longstanding ban on corporate and union donations to federal candidates.66 The conceptual basis for soft
money’s evasion of federal contribution restrictions was that
the donations did not go to specific candidates, or to parties for
direct support of specific candidates, but instead were given to
pay for party activities that aided candidates only indirectly,
such as voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives, generic
party advertising, or campaign ads that did not expressly advocate the election or defeat of clearly identified federal candidates.67 In the absence of a direct relationship between the donor and a specific candidate, soft money defenders claimed
there was no danger of corruption.68 McConnell, however, found
substantial evidence that federal officeholders and party leaders avidly sought soft money even if given to party accounts
they did not control, and that wealthy individuals, corporations, and unions provided soft money “for the express purpose

62. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–29 (1975) ( per curiam).
63. Id. at 28.
64. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
65. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
66. See id. at 122–26 (describing soft money).
67. See id. at 123 (discussing the FEC’s ruling that parties could use soft
money to fund “mixed-purpose activities” that support multiple candidates on
a party’s ticket).
68. See, e.g., id. at 149–50 (discussing the arguments of soft-money defenders).
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of securing influence over federal officials.”69 Under these circumstances, there was no need for an express donor-candidate
relationship or for proof of a tie between a donation and a specific legislative or other governmental goal of the donor to establish “corruption.” Rather, the Court took a much broader
approach, concluding that Congress could reasonably determine that money given to party committees to enable donors to
obtain preferential access to officials and thereby influence
government decision-making could constitute corruption sufficient to justify restriction.70
Although McConnell did not address independent spending, the Court’s more capacious definition of corruption in
terms of the opportunity for influence resulting from the preferential access gained by campaign money suggested that
Buckley’s quasi-empirical rejection of an anti-corruption justification for limiting independent spending might be subject to
reconsideration on a showing that independent spending was
also a source of preferential access and influence. Other cases
had also left open the possibility that independent spending
could be shown to have corrupting effects. In First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, even as it struck down a state ban on
corporate spending in ballot proposition elections, the Court
acknowledged that “Congress might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent corruption
in independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections.”71 Similarly, when it struck down limits on independent expenditures in support of or opposition to presidential candidates who had accepted public funding, the Court
acknowledged that it is “hypothetically possible . . . that candidates may take notice of and reward those responsible for PAC
[independent] expenditures by giving official favors to the latter in exchange for the supporting messages.”72 In Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court upheld on anticorruption grounds a state law prohibiting corporate independent expenditures,73 albeit in an opinion that emphasized the
special “state-conferred” advantages provided by the corporate
form.74 So, too, the Court in McConnell approved BCRA’s ex69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 147.
Id. at 142–54.
435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26, 795 (1978).
FEC v. Nat’l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985).
494 U.S. 652, 698–99 (1990).
Id. at 660.
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tension of the comparable federal ban to corporate and union
electioneering communications that did not involve express
electoral advocacy.75 In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.
the Court found that an independent expenditure could be just
as corrupting as a contribution of comparable size when it held
that a judge elected after an election campaign in which he had
been the beneficiary of millions of dollars of independent spending was required by the Constitution to recuse himself from a
case involving the independent spender.76 Given the size of the
independent expenditure in question, “there is a serious risk of
bias——based on objective and reasonable perceptions.”77
Stunningly, Caperton completely blurred the contribution/expenditure distinction first developed in Buckley and
carefully sustained by the Court for over thirty-three years
when it repeatedly referred to the very large independent expenditures at issue in the case as “contributions.”78 To be sure,
Caperton was a due process case that did not turn on the First
Amendment or involve any limits on independent spending.
Nevertheless, Caperton at least tacitly recognized there are circumstances in which independent expenditures have the same
potential to corruptly influence the actions of elected officials as
contributions.
Thus, on the eve of Citizens United there were two strands
in Supreme Court doctrine that pointed in different directions
if restrictions on contributions to political committees that
make only independent expenditures were ever challenged. On
the one hand, CARC and Justice Blackmun’s dictum in his
CalMed concurrence implied that contributions to independent
expenditure-only committees may not be limited because independent expenditures pose no danger of corruption. On the other hand, McConnell and Caperton broadened the Court’s working definition of corruption, and McConnell found that
contributions not tied to any candidate’s campaign could be
limited on a showing that such contributions enabled their donors to obtain preferential access to elected officials. Although
McConnell did not address independent expenditures, its concern with the influence obtained by soft money donations could
provide support for restrictions on donations to independent
groups if and when it could be demonstrated that such dona75.
76.
77.
78.

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 203–09 (2003).
556 U.S. 868, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265–67 (2009).
Id. at 2263.
Id. at 2263–65.
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tions are also a means of obtaining preferential access to elected officials.
B. LOWER COURT STIRRINGS
The question of whether contributions to independent
groups could be limited became more salient in the 2000s after
Congress adopted, and the Court sustained, BCRA’s soft money
restrictions. Due to BCRA’s much tighter regulation of soft
money contributions to political parties, some donors—
particularly very wealthy individuals—began to make very
large contributions to 527 committees.79 This led to new proposals, arguably bolstered by McConnell’s validation of the restrictions on party soft money, to more closely regulate the
527s.
1. North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake
In 2003, in North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
struck down a North Carolina law capping individual contributions to independent expenditure committees.80 The court determined the state had “failed to proffer sufficiently convincing
evidence which demonstrates that there is a danger of corruption due to the presence of unchecked contributions” to independent expenditure-only committees.81 The court cited and
quoted Justice Blackmun’s CalMed concurrence, but did not
treat it as absolutely barring restrictions on donations to independent expenditure-only committees.82 Rather, it concluded
that limiting such donations required more evidence of a corrupting effect than was needed to justify limits on donations to
candidate committees, and it found the state had failed to carry
that heavier burden of proof.83 That decision was vacated and
remanded by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of
McConnell,84 but in 2008 the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed its original position.85 The court emphasized that McConnell had up79. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 19, at 964 –65.
80. 344 F.3d 418, 433–34 (4th Cir. 2003).
81. Id. at 434.
82. Id. (citing Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 435 U.S. 182, 203 (1981)
(Blackmun, J., concurring)).
83. Id.
84. Leake v. N.C. Right to Life, Inc., 541 U.S. 1007, 124 S. Ct. 2065, 2065
(2004).
85. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 308 (4th Cir. 2008).
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held limits only on contributions to political parties, which, as
McConnell itself had noted, are closely tied to candidates, “have
special access to and relationships with” elected officials, and
“have influence and power in the Legislature that vastly exceeds that of any interest group.”86 With independent committees “further removed from the candidate” than political parties, the Fourth Circuit restated its prior position that “it is
‘implausible’ that contributions to independent expenditure political committees are corrupting.”87 Leake did not completely
rule out the possibility that contributions to independent expenditure committees could be limited, finding that such a limit
could be upheld if North Carolina could “produce convincing evidence of corruption” resulting from independent committee activities.88 But substantial independent committee spending
alone—even spending targeted at specific candidates or that influenced candidates’ positions—did not constitute the
“sufficiently convincing evidence” of corruption” that the court
deemed necessary to support limits on contributions to independent expenditure committees.89
2. EMILY’s List v. Federal Election Commission
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in EMILY’s List v. FEC grew directly out of the efforts of the FEC to deal with the surging role
of non-profit 527 committees in the aftermath of BCRA’s imposition of limits on political party soft money.90 Like many 527’s,
EMILY’s List engaged in both election-related activities in support of or opposition to federal candidates and broader get-outthe-vote and voter registration activities not tied to a particular
candidate. It also paid for communications referring to a particular party, but not particular candidates, and advertisements or communications that referred to candidates but did
not expressly advocate their election or defeat. To make sure
that only hard money—that is, contributions that complied
with FECA’s dollar limits and source prohibitions——was used
to pay for the efforts of 527’s that support federal candidates,
the FEC adopted rules requiring that at least some of a 527’s
non-candidate-specific activities, which could also benefit fed86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 293 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 95, 188 (2003)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
581 F.3d 1, 4 –5 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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eral candidates, be funded in part by hard money.91 Thus, the
FEC’s rules required that half of the costs of generic get-outthe-vote and voter registration activities, half of the cost of
communications that refer to a party only, half of the committee’s administrative expenses, and at least some portion of the
cost of advertisements that refer to federal candidates be paid
for with hard money.92
EMILY’s List struck down these requirements as unconstitutional.93 In the course of its analysis, Judge Kavanaugh’s
opinion initially considered an issue not before the court—
whether donations to independent expenditure-only committees
could be limited.94 Relying heavily on Justice Blackmun’s
CalMed concurrence and on CARC, he determined that as independent expenditures are not corrupting, the contributions
funding them could not be corrupting.95 In the court’s view,
McConnell did not affect this analysis, as McConnell’s validation of limits on contributions not going to particular candidates applied only to contributions to political parties.96 Those
limits were justified by “the close ties between candidates and
parties and the extensive record evidence [before the
McConnell court] of what it deemed a threat of actual or apparent corruption—specifically, the access to federal officials and
candidates that large soft-money contributors to political parties received in exchange for their contributions.”97 In the absence of “record evidence that non-profit entities have sold access to federal candidates and officeholders in exchange for
large contributions,” contributions to non-profit independent
spending committees, unlike contributions to parties, could not
be limited.98
EMILY’s List’s discussion of independent expenditure-only
committees was technically dicta; EMILY’s List both made contributions to candidates and engaged in independent spending.99 As a result, EMILY’s List and committees like it could be
required to make their contributions to federal candidates only
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 16–17.
See id. at 15–18.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 8–11.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 13.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 14.
Id. at 12.
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from contributions that observed federal dollar limits and
source restrictions, and could be required to “pay an appropriately tailored share of administrative expenses associated with
their contributions” from their hard-money accounts.100 But the
court relied on its finding that contributions to independent expenditure-only committees could not be limited in holding that
EMILY’s List and similar committees could not be required to
use dollar- or source-limited hard money contributions to pay
for expenditures that were not contributions to candidates or
associated administrative expenses.101
Leake and EMILY’s List, thus, rejected the argument that
McConnell’s reasoning—particularly its focus on the political
influence a large donation can win a donor even when the donation does not go directly to a candidate—supported regulation of contributions to independent committees that were not
used to pay for contributions to candidates.102 McConnell was
cabined as a political parties case, not treated as a more general principle supporting limits on any donations that could
win the donor political favors.103 To be sure, both Leake and
EMILY’s List left open the possibility that limits on donations
to independent committees could be sustained on a showing
that independent committees “sold access to federal candidates
and officeholders in exchange for large contributions.”104 But
both courts expressed considerable doubts that such evidence
could ever be found.105 Citizens United soon shut the door to the
possibility that independent spending could ever be deemed
corrupting, thereby setting the stage for the authorization of
Super PACs a few months after that.
C. CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC
Barely six months after Caperton blurred contributions
with independent expenditures and treated the latter as having
100. Id.
101. Id. at 14.
102. Id. at 13–14; N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 293 (4th
Cir. 2003).
103. See EMILY’s List, 581 F.3d at 13–14; N.C. Right to Life, Inc., 525 F.3d
at 293.
104. EMILY’s List, 581 F.3d at 14; see also N.C. Right to Life, Inc., 525 F.3d
at 293 (“Given the remove [sic] of independent expenditure committees from
candidates themselves, we must require North Carolina to produce convincing
evidence of corruption before upholding contribution limits as applied to such
organizations.”).
105. EMILY’s List, 581 F.3d at 14; N.C. Right to Life, Inc., 525 F.3d at 293.
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effects on beneficiaries comparable to the former, Citizens United determined that independent expenditures raised no danger
of the corruption that would justify limitation.106 Citizens United sharply distinguished the concerns about undue influence,
special access, and the favoritism resulting from large donations which had loomed so large in McConnell from the corruption that Buckley required to justify campaign finance restrictions. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy declared,
“[t]he fact that speakers may have influence over or access to
elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt.”107 Similarly, “[i]ngratiation and access, in any event, are
not corruption.”108 So, too, the “appearance of influence or access . . . will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy” and thus cannot provide a basis for regulation in the
name of preventing the “appearance . . . of corruption.”109 Most
strikingly, the Court appeared to acknowledge that independent spending might actually sometimes be corrupting in fact
when it observed that elected officials might “succumb to improper influences from independent expenditures.”110 Indeed,
Justice Kennedy observed, “if they surrender their best judgment, and if they put expediency before principle, then surely
there is cause for concern.”111 But even that concern could not
support limits on independent expenditures, regardless of the
empirical evidence of their effects on the elected officials who
benefit from them.112 To that end, Caperton was dismissed as a
case about a litigant’s due process right to a fair trial before an
unbiased judge; it did not provide support for any limits on
campaign spending.113
Noting its prior case law had left “open the possibility” that
independent expenditures “could be shown to cause corruption,” Citizens United spoke firmly and categorically: “[W]e now
conclude that independent expenditures, including those made
by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”114
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 911.
Id.
Id. at 910–11.
Id. at 910.
Id. at 909.
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Citizens United was a case about the rights of corporations
to make independent expenditures. It said nothing at all about
the rights of wealthy individuals to make contributions to independent committees Indeed, the Court made much of the contribution/expenditure distinction in invalidating limits on corporate spending.115 Prior cases that had upheld limits on
corporate contributions, and even on a corporation’s solicitation
of contributions to its PAC,116 were dismissed as of “little relevance here”117 as those “involved contribution limits” while Citizens United was an independent spending case.118 But within a
few months, Citizens United was invoked to strike down the
limits on donations to independent expenditure committees, resulting in the emergence of Super PACs.
D. SPEECHNOW.ORG
Less than one week after Citizens United, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit sitting en banc heard oral argument in the challenge brought by
SpeechNow.org, an unincorporated nonprofit association that
sought to engage in express advocacy independent spending in
support of federal candidates.119 SpeechNow stated it would acquire funds only from individuals and not from corporations.120
SpeechNow claimed it would be unconstitutional to require it to
register as a FECA political committee and to abide by federal
reporting and disclosure requirements and contribution restrictions; as the organization would not make any contributions to candidates its activities assertedly raised no danger of
corruption.121 Two months later the court held unanimously
that although the registration, reporting, and disclosure requirements could be applied to SpeechNow, it would be unconstitutional to apply either FECA’s $5000 per calendar year cap
on contributions to political committees or the statute’s biennial aggregate limit on all contributions to committees involved
in federal elections.122
The court determined that, given Citizens United, “the
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909.
Id.
SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 690.
Id.
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analysis is straight-forward . . . . [T]he government has no anticorruption interest in limiting independent expenditures.”123
The FEC argued that, as in McConnell, large contributions to
groups that aid candidates will make the benefited candidates
grateful, which can lead to “preferential access for donors and
undue influence over officeholders.”124 But the court concluded
that “whatever the merits of those arguments before Citizens
United, they plainly have no merit after Citizens United.”125 As
Citizens United held “as a matter of law” that independent expenditures do not corrupt or create the appearance of corruption, “contributions to groups that make only independent expenditures also cannot corrupt or create the appearance of
corruption . . . . The Court has effectively held that there is no
corrupting ‘quid’ for which a candidate might in exchange offer
a corrupt ‘quo.’”126 As a result, “the government can have no anti-corruption interest in limiting contributions to independent
expenditure-only organizations.”127
SpeechNow’s reading of Citizens United and its invalidation of limits on contributions to independent expenditure-only
committees has since been followed by two other courts of appeals. The Ninth Circuit, in two decisions handed down in 2010
and 2011, addressed provisions of ordinances adopted by the
cities of Long Beach and San Diego that limited contributions
to committees that independently supported or opposed candidates. The Long Beach opinion, handed down just a few weeks
after SpeechNow, was partially empirical.128 Like Leake and
EMILY’s List, which were cited extensively,129 the Long Beach
court found that the independent committees in question—
PACs run by the Long Beach Chamber of Commerce—were
“several significant steps removed from ‘the case in which a donor gives money directly to a candidate,’”130 and had no “‘close
123. Id. at 693 (emphasis in original).
124. Id. at 694.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 694 –95.
127. Id. at 696.
128. Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684
(9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 392 (2010). Technically, the Long Beach
ordinance prohibited independent spending concerning a candidate by any entity that accepted “contribution[s] in excess of $350 to $650, depending upon
the office for which the candidate is running,” id. at 687, but the court treated
the restriction as a contribution limit. Id. at 696–99.
129. See id. at 687, 692–93, 696–97, 699.
130. Id. at 696 (quoting N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 291
(2008)).
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connection and alignment,’ ‘close affiliation,’ [or] ‘nexus’ with
candidates.”131 As their “relationship with candidates is, at
best, attenuated,”132 and as the city had acknowledged that it
was unable to “identify a single instance of corruption, quid pro
quo or otherwise, involving contributions to [independent expenditure committees] for use as independent expenditures,”133
the court held that the contribution limits could not be applied
to donations to the Long Beach Chamber of Commerce PACs.134
The San Diego decision, handed down a little more than a
year later,135 was more categorical, relying extensively on Citizens United’s protection of independent expenditures and its
narrowing of McConnell’s definition of corruption.136 Rather
than emphasize the lack of any evidence of corruption, the
court focused on the lack of any direct tie between the San Diego PACs that had challenged the city’s ordinance and municipal candidates as well as the lack of “historical interconnection
with candidates that distinguishes political parties.”137
At the close of 2011, in Wisconsin Right to Life State Political Action Committee v. Barland, the Seventh Circuit followed
the District of Columbia and Ninth Circuits in finding that contributions to independent expenditure-only committees may not
constitutionally be limited.138 The case involved a challenge by
the Wisconsin Right to Life State Political Action Committee to
Wisconsin’s relatively high $10,000 per calendar year limit on
individual donations to state and local candidates, political parties, and political committees.139 The Seventh Circuit treated
the case as governed entirely by the principles establishing that
“[t]he threat of quid pro quo corruption does not arise when independent groups spend money on political speech,” so that it
followed purely “as a matter of law and logic, that Wisconsin’s
$10,000 aggregate annual contribution limit is unconstitutional
as applied to organizations, like the Right to Life PAC, that engage only in independent expenditures.”140 Although the state
contended that large donations to independent expenditure
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 155 (2003)).
Id. at 697.
Id.
Id. at 699.
Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1118–21.
Id. at 1121.
664 F.3d 139, 155 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 143.
Id. at 153–54.
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committees can give rise to corruption in indirect ways
“through ‘the proverbial ‘wink or nod’ between donor and candidate regarding the donor’s ‘uncoordinated’ beyond-limits contribution,”141 the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument, finding that after Citizens United “[a]s a categorical matter,”
independent expenditures ‘do not give rise to corruption.’”142
SpeechNow and the other court of appeals decisions began
the process of dismantling limits on contributions to independent expenditure-only committees. The formal authorization of
Super PACs at the federal level occurred as a result of FEC decisions in the summer of 2010.
E. THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION AUTHORIZES FEDERAL
SUPER PACS
Federal Super PACs were officially born when the FEC
handed down a pair of advisory opinions on July 22, 2010. In
Club for Growth, Inc., the FEC determined that the Club, an
ideologically conservative non-profit 501(c)(4) corporation, could
create a federally-registered independent expenditure-only
committee, pay for its administrative and solicitation costs, and
seek unlimited contributions to the committee from the general
public.143 This represented two departures from the federal
laws covering political committees. First, a political committee
established and administered by a corporation—technically, a
“separate, segregated fund”144—is limited to soliciting contributions only from people affiliated with the corporation, such as
stockholders, executive and administrative personnel, employees, and family members of these groups.145 Second, as already
noted, FECA limits the amount that can be contributed to a
corporate PAC. However, citing Citizens United, EMILY’s List,
and SpeechNow, the FEC concluded that as the Club for
Growth’s proposed committee “intends to make only independent expenditures, there is no basis to impose contribution limits
on the Committee” or on its solicitations.146
The Advisory Opinion noted that the Club for Growth already had a PAC that made contributions to candidates and
that the president of the Club, who was treasurer of the exist141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 155 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
FEC Advisory Op. 2010-09, at 3–5 (2010).
2 U.S.C. § 441b( b)(4)(A)(i) (2006).
Id.
FEC Advisory Op. 2010-09, at 4.
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ing PAC, would also serve as treasurer of the new committee.147
However, given the Club’s representation that the new committee would not engage in coordinated activity with the candidates it supports, it would still be exempt from FECA’s contribution limits.148
On the same day, the FEC also advised Commonsense Ten,
an independent committee newly created to spend independently in support of Democratic candidates, that it, too, was
not subject to FECA’s contribution restrictions on political
committees.149 Going beyond Club for Growth, Commonsense
Ten indicated it would solicit and accept unlimited contributions from corporations, unions, and other political committees,
as well as individuals.150 Like the Club for Growth committee,
it would register with the FEC and file regularly scheduled disclosure reports.151 The FEC agreed that the committee could
accept unlimited donations from corporations, unions, and political committees as well as individuals.152 The Super PAC capable of both unlimited fundraising for independent expenditures and unlimited independent spending was fully launched.
In 2011, the FEC dealt with a handful of other Super PAC
issues that reflected the rapid development of the new campaign finance vehicle. The FEC’s actions and inactions continued to reshape the legal landscape in ways that encouraged the
further development of the Super PAC phenomenon. In an advisory opinion issued in June in response to a request from Majority PAC (the successor to Commonsense Ten) and House Majority PAC (two committees formed to engage in independent
spending in support of democratic congressional candidates),
the FEC determined that federal officeholders and candidates,
and national party officials could “attend, speak at, or be featured . . . fundraisers” at Super PAC events at which donations
in unlimited amounts were solicited from individuals, corporations, and unions.153 The only restriction the FEC applied to
fundraising by federal candidates and party officials is that
they could not actually ask for more than $5000.154 As part of
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
FEC Advisory Op. 2010-11, at 2–3 (2010).
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
FEC Advisory Op. 2011-12, at 4 (2011).
Id.
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BCRA’s soft-money restrictions, Congress had barred federal
candidates, federal officials, and national party officials from
raising any funds that did not comply with federal dollar limits
and source restrictions.155 These provisions had been specifically upheld in McConnell and were not specifically challenged in
Citizens United or SpeechNow.156 As a result, dollar limits and
source restrictions continue to apply to the amounts a federal
candidate, a federal official, or a party official can ask for and
which entities they can solicit.157 But there are no restrictions
on the ability of a candidate to appear at a fundraiser for and
urge donations to a Super PAC intending to use those funds to
support that candidate or attack her opponent.158
Subsequently, as a result of a federal district court decision, the FEC agreed that a formally separate committee was
not necessary for a PAC to enjoy Super PAC status. In Carey v.
FEC, the federal district court for the District of Columbia held
that the National Defense Political Action Committee, a political committee not connected to any other organization, could
make contributions, engage in independent spending, and accept unlimited contributions for its independent expenditures.159 The Committee could do so provided it maintained
separate “hard-money” and “soft-money” bank accounts, with a
proper allocation of administrative costs between them.160 The
court issued a preliminary injunction barring the FEC from enforcing FECA’s contribution limits with respect to such a “hybrid PACs” independent expenditures.161 The FEC subsequently stated it would no longer enforce any statutory or regulatory
provisions barring corporate, union, or unlimited individual
contributions to the “non-contribution account,” that is, the independent expenditure accounts of such committees.162 Carey is
155. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441i(a)(1), 441i(e)(1)(A) (2006).
156. See FEC Advisory Op. 2011-12, at 4.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 5.
159. Carey v. FEC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 121, 131–32 (D.D.C. 2011). The FEC
had previously failed to act on a request from the National Defense PAC for an
advisory opinion approving its plan to set up separate bank accounts to pay for
contributions and for independent expenditures, and to accept unlimited contributions for the latter. Three commissioners had been prepared to approve
the plan while two were opposed. With four affirmative votes needed to approve an advisory opinion, the FEC was deadlocked. Id. at 127.
160. Id. at 131–32.
161. Id. at 136.
162. News Release, FEC, FEC Statement on Carey v. FEC: Reporting Guidance for Political Committees that Maintain a Non-Contribution Account (Oct. 5,
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flatly inconsistent with CalMed, including Justice Blackmun’s
concurring opinion, as the National Defense PAC, like the
CalMed PAC, intended to make both contributions to federal
candidates and express advocacy independent expenditures
concerning them. The district court, however, did not refer to
CalMed, let alone attempt to distinguish it. Instead, it concluded that the result was required by EMILY’s List, SpeechNow,
and Citizens United.163 Of course, given that Club for Growth
had previously upheld the ability of one organization to maintain both a PAC and a Super PAC with the same person as
treasurer for both entities,164 the practical consequence of permitting one entity with two bank accounts to do the same thing
may not be significant. Still, the court’s easy assumption that
the arrangement now must be constitutional is striking and is
further evidence of the impact of Citizens United.
At the close of 2011, the FEC grappled with two advisory
opinion requests that, even more than the fundraising solicitation issue raised in Majority Ten and House Majority Ten,
demonstrate how closely tied Super PACs have become to specific candidates. On December 1, the FEC deadlocked over a
question raised by American Crossroads—which was, by far,
the Super PAC that raised and spent the most money in
2010165—regarding whether it could produce and distribute
broadcast ads that would feature incumbent members of Congress up for reelection, speaking on camera (or in voice over)
and discussing a legislative or policy issue in a manner “thematically similar to the incumbent Members’ own re-election
2011), available at http://www.fec.gov/press/Press2011/20111006postcarey.shtml.
As noted in text, the National Defense PAC was not sponsored by a parent
organization. In campaign finance parlance, it was a non-connected PAC as distinguished from a “separate, segregated fund” created and supported by a parent corporation or union. See note 13, supra. On March 1, 2012, the FEC deadlocked over
the question of whether a separate segregated fund could also operate as a hybrid
PAC. See Matter of Stop This Insanity, Inc. Employee leadership Fund, AO 201201 (draft advisory opinion to permit separate segregated fund to operate as a hybrid PAC failed on a vote of 3-3; draft advisory opinion to bar separate segregated
fund from operating as a hybrid PAC failed by a 3-3 vote),
http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao?SUBMIT=ao&AO=3407.
By mid-February 2012, there were approximately two dozen hybrid PACs.
See Dave Levinthal, Hybrid PACs pick up the pace, Politico, Feb. 14, 2012,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/72849.html.
163. See Carey, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 128–36.
164. See FEC Advisory Op. 2010-09, at 4 (2010).
165. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Super PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Mar. 5,
2012) [hereinafter Super PACs] http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/superpacs.php?
cycle=2010.
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campaign materials . . ., ” “us[ing] phrases or slogans that the
Member has previously used,” and with the goal of “improv[ing]
the public’s perception of the featured Member of Congress in
advance of the 2012 campaign season.”166 Some of these ads
might also feature criticism of the candidate’s electoral opponents.167 American Crossroads candidly stated all the advertisements would be “fully coordinated” with the candidates so
aided “insofar as each Member would be consulted on the advertisement script and would then appear in the advertisement” but also asserted the ads would not contain any “express
advocacy or the functional equivalent of express advocacy.” 168
Three commissioners concluded that American Crossroads’
frank acknowledgement that its advertising program would be
“fully coordinated [with the candidates]” whose reelection the
organization sought to promote meant the ads were effectively
contributions within the meaning of FECA169 so that they could
not be paid for by an independent expenditure-only committee.170 But three other commissioners found that the proposed
ads were not “coordinated expenditures” within the meaning of
FEC regulations.171 In their view, the ads, even if coordinatedin-fact with candidates, did not cease to be independent expenditures within the meaning of FEC regulations.172 The regulation defining “coordinated expenditure” required consideration of the content of the ads as well as the relationship
between the sponsor and the candidate aided by the ad.173 It
exempted from a finding of coordination ads that avoided express advocacy or the functional equivalent of express advocacy
concerning candidates, even if decisions concerning whether
and where to air the ad and determining its content were actually coordinated between the candidate and the ostensibly independent committee.174 Moreover, these commissioners reasoned that “there are many reasons why candidates can and
166. FEC Advisory Op. 2011-23, at 1 (2011) (request for advisory opinion by
American Crossroads).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(8)(A)(1), 441a(a)((7)(B) (2006), invalidated by
SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 559 F.3d 686, 688 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
170. FEC Advisory Op. 2011-23, at 2 (2011) (vote); FEC Advisory Op.
2011-23, at 3, 7–8 (2011) (agenda document No. 11-68-A).
171. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21 (2011).
172. See id.
173. See id. § 109.21(a), (c).
174. See id.
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should work with outside groups on important issues or legislation.”175 Although the deadlock meant the Commission could
not green light American Crossroads’ proposal, the three votes
in favor of the Super PAC’s position strongly suggests that the
FEC is highly unlikely to bring an enforcement action against
American Crossroads if it undertakes the projected ad campaign.
Finally, also at the end of the year, the FEC did impose one
check on a planned Super PAC. Utah Republican Senator Michael Shumway Lee sought permission to create an independent spending account within his leadership PAC, the Constitutional Conservatives Fund PAC.176 He also sought permission
to solicit unlimited contributions to an account to be used to
pay for ads expressly calling for the election or defeat of clearly
identified federal candidatesother than Senator Lee himself.177 A leadership PAC is a committee “directly or indirectly
established, financed, maintained or controlled” by a federal official or candidate for federal office but is not the candidate’s
authorized campaign committee.178 Federal candidates and officeholders use leadership PACs to assist other candidates,
such as fellow party members, in their campaigns or to pay for
non-election-related political expenses of the PAC’s sponsor.179
Senator Lee contended that his leadership PAC, like any other
PAC, could engage in unlimited independent spending on behalf of federal candidates without raising the danger of corruption, so that he too should be able to accept unlimited contributions into the independent spending account of his leadership
PAC.180 Whatever the logic of his argument in light of Citizens
United, EMILY’s List, and SpeechNow, however, the Commission concluded that this issue, much like the solicitation of contributions by federal candidates and officials considered in Majority PAC and House Majority PAC, was resolved by the BCRA
provision181 sustained in McConnell and not challenged by any
later court decision; barring federal candidates and officials
from soliciting, receiving, directing, transferring, or spending
175. FEC Advisory Op. 2011-23 (agenda document No. 11-68-A) (statement
of Vice Chair Caroline C. Hunter and Commissioners Donald F. McGahn and
Matthew S. Petersen).
176. FEC Advisory Op. 2011-21, at 1 (2011) (Request by Constitutional
Conservatives Fund PAC).
177. Id.
178. 2 U.S.C. § 434(i)(8)(B) (2006).
179. See, e.g., FEC Advisory Op. 2011-21, at 1–2.
180. See id.
181. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e)(1).
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election funds that do not comply with federal contribution limits and source prohibitions.182
The Constitutional Conservatives Fund decision was only a
relatively minor check on the expansive legal development of
Super PACs. At the start of the spring of 2010, Super PACs did
not exist. By the close of the fall of 2011, through a combination
of court decisions and FEC advisory opinions and nondecisions, these new campaign finance instruments could raise
and spend unlimited funds provided by individuals, corporations, and unions; use the very candidates they supported to
fund-raise for them; make contributions to candidates (albeit
only with hard money funds) as well as aid them with independent expenditures; and, given the deadlocked response to
the American Crossroads advisory opinion request, probably
collaborate with candidates in preparing campaign ads that use
footage of the candidates and sound the candidates’ own
themes provided they avoid express advocacy or the functional
equivalent of express advocacy in those ads. Moreover, as the
progression of cases indicates, Super PACs have very quickly
evolved from truly independent committees devoted to ideological causes, like the right to life organizations in Leake, the
chambers of commerce in Long Beach, and the ideological conservatives in Club for Growth, to the more plainly partisan
committees in Commonsense Ten, and organizations working
very closely with specific candidates as in Majority Ten and
House Majority Ten and American Crossroads. As the discussion in the next Part indicates, by late 2011 and early 2012
many Super PACs were created to aid specific candidates and
were effectively part of the campaigns of the candidates they
aided. As such, their rise appears to signal the end of the modern effort to limit the size and source of contributions to candidates.
III. SUPER PACS ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL
A. 2010
Super PACs were not officially recognized by the FEC until
late July 2010, but they got off to a very fast start. By the end
of the 2010 congressional elections less than four months later,
eighty-four groups had registered with the FEC as Super
182. Letter from Cynthia L. Bauerly, Chair, FEC, to DB Capitol Strategies,
PLLC (Dec. 1, 2011) (on file with FEC), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/
saos/searchao? SUBMIT= ao&AO=3349.
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PACs.183 These groups reported raising nearly $85 million and
spending just over $65 million on independent expenditures
expressly supporting or opposing federal candidates.184 Although less than a quarter of the more than $290 million spent
by all outside groups on independent expenditures and electioneering communications in the 2009–10 election cycle,185 this
amount was still a substantial development, especially given
the short period of time in which Super PACs could operate. In
effect, the Super PACs were raising an average of roughly $5
million a week during the period they were active. Super PACs
reported making expenditures of at least $250,000 in 111 different House and Senate races, and spending at least a half
million dollars in each of twenty-five contests.186 Super PAC
independent spending was equal to 20% or more of total candidate spending in four elections.187 In the hotly contested Colorado Senate race, Super PACs spent more than $10 millionmore than 40%of the total amount spent by the
competing Republican and Democratic candidates.188
Although those potential donors who prize anonymity may
prefer to give to 501(c) organizations not subject to public disclosure, Super PACs also enjoy certain fund-raising advantages. Not only are they free to expressly advocate for and
against candidates, but they need not veil their fund-raising
appeals in the language of issue advocacy. As David Keating,
the executive director of Club for Growth, explained to the
Washington Post, fund-raising appeals for issue advocacy
groups “were awkward and forced the organizations to be vague
about their intentions.”189 In his words, “[w]hat’s really liberating about this particular type of organization is that you can
actually talk to people honestly about what you want to
do. . . . Raising money is also a lot easier and more on the upand-up for everyone involved.”190
Of the more than eighty Super PACs active in 2010, ten ac183. Super PACs, supra note 165.
184. Id.
185. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
Outside Spending, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/ ( last visited Jan.
25, 2012).
186. GARRETT, supra note 2, at 17.
187. Id. at 18.
188. Id.
189. Dan Eggen & T.W. Farnam, ‘Super PACs’ Alter Campaign, WASH.
POST, Sept. 28, 2010, at A6.
190. Id.
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counted for almost seventy-five percent of total Super PAC
campaign spending, with American Crossroads towering over
the entire field.191 Founded in part by President George W.
Bush’s chief political adviser Karl Rove,192 American Crossroads raised more than $26 million and spent more than $21
million on independent expenditures, or about a third of total
Super PAC campaign spending in 2010.193 American Crossroads spent nearly $6 million in the Colorado Senate race, $2.7
million in the Missouri Senate race (out of $3.3 million spent by
all Super PACs in that contest), and more than $2 million in
the Florida Senate election.194 All of American Crossroads’
spending was either for the Republican candidate or, as with
the $5.1 million in negative ads aimed at Colorado’s Democratic
Senator Michael Bennet, against Democrats.195 In general, Super PAC spending tended to be negative.196 Whereas independent spending by traditional PACs in 2010 consisted of $48 million in positive ads and $20 million in negative ads, threequarters of Super PAC independent expenditures were for negative ads.197
Perhaps most striking given the role Citizens United
played in mid-wifing the birth of Super PACs, corporate contributions amounted to only a modest share of Super PAC
fundsapproximately 23%.198 Although news accounts noted
the $1 million donation American Crossroads received from
Dixie Rice Agricultural Corp.,199 other stories reported on the
191. See GARRETT, supra note 2, at 12–13.
192. See Dave Cook, Karl Rove ‘Super PAC’ Won’t Favor Any 2012 Candidate During Primaries, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 24, 2011),
www.csmonitor.com/USA/politics/mintor_breakfast/2011/0624/Karl-Rovesuper-PAC-won-t-favor-any-2012-canddiate-during-primaries.
193. 2010 Outside Spending, supra note 2.
194. See GARRETT, supra note 2, at 18; Ctr. for Responsive Politics, American
Crossroads Independent Expenditures, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Jan. 27, 2011),
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/indexpend.php?strID=C00487363&cycle=2010.
195. See FEC, 2010 FALL ELECTION CYCLE SUMMARY DATA TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES (2010), www.fec.gov/press/bkgnd/cf
.summary.info/2010pac_fullsum/3indepexp2010.pdf.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See Diana Dwyre, After Citizens United and SpeechNow.org Considering the Consequences of New Campaign Finance Rules 13–14 (Sept. 1–4,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1901547.
199. Jonathan D. Salant & Kristin Jensen, ‘Super PACs’ Multiply to Sway
Election, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Sept. 9, 2010, 9:53 AM), http://
businessweek.com/busdaily/dnflash/content/Sep2010.db2010099_789434.htm.
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multi-hundred-thousand and multi-million dollar gifts to Super
PACs from very wealthy individuals, including $7 million to
American Crossroads from Texas magnate Bob J. Perry, who
had been a prime financial backer of the anti-Kerry group Swift
Boat Veterans for Truth in 2004.200 In general, more of the
money given to Super PACs seems to have come from “privateequity partners and hedge fund managers,”201 and corporate
executives and owners than from the corporate treasury funds
unleashed by Citizens United. Citizens United may have drawn
public attention and concern because of its validation of corporate campaign spending; but in the short run at least its principal consequence appears to have been to make it easier for
very wealthy individuals who had already been free to spend
independently to pool their funds and give them to organizations run by expert political operatives for use in election campaigns.
B. 2011 AND THE START OF 2012
Early indications are that 2010 was just a warm-up election for Super PACs, and that their real impact will be in 2012.
Even before the end of 2011, 258 groups had registered as Super PACs with the FEC—or three times the number active in
2010—and they had reported receiving $32 million and spending $11 million.202 By early April 2012, the number of Super
PACs had risen to 421, and they reported raising more than
$155 million and spending nearly $ 90 million.203
More striking even than the explosive growth in the number of Super PACs has been their change in focus. In 2010, the
Super PACs that spent the most money—including American
Crossroads, America’s Families First Action Fund, Club for
Growth Action, NEA Action, Women Vote!, and Commonsense
Ten—were broadly ideological, partisan, or connected to traditional interest groups like unions, trade associations, or envi-

200. Jim Kuhnhenn, Texas Millionaire Gives $7 Million to GOP Group, SETIMES, Oct. 20, 2010, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/
html/politics/2013214018_apuscampaignmoney.html.
201. T.W. Farnam, 72 Super PACs Spent $83.7 Million on Election, WASH.
POST, Dec. 4, 2010, at A3.
202. Super PACs, supra note 165.
ATTLE

Ctr for Responsive Politics, 2012 Outside Spending, by Super PACs (April 11,
2012) [hereinafter Super PACs April 2012]
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&type=
S.
203
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ronmentalists.204 Some, most prominently American Crossroads, were tightly linked to a particular party, but none were
focused on a specific candidate or sponsored by a particular
party leader.205 That changed in 2011 and 2012. With the exception of American Crossroads, the leading Super PACs in the
opening year of the 2011–12 election cycle were all organized to
back a specific candidate or were formed at the behest of party
leaders.206
The leading Super PAC, in terms of receipts and expenditures, was Restore Our Future; which was organized by Governor Mitt Romney’s 2008 campaign treasurer and political director, and which was joined in the summer of 2011 by the
Romney campaign’s chief fund-raiser.207 Restore Our Future
reported receipts of more than $ 43 million as of early April
2012, and expenditures of more than $ 40 million.208 According
to news accounts, it had spent $5 million even before the New
Hampshire primary.209 The Super PAC Make Us Great Again
was founded by Governor Rick Perry’s former chief of staff
shortly before the governor declared his candidacy for the Republican presidential nomination,210 and was one of nine Super
PACs supporting Perry.211 It had spent $3.8 million by the start
of 2012.212 An executive of the Huntsman Corporation—the
family business that is the source of Utah Governor John
Huntsman’s personal wealth—filed the papers forming Our
Destiny PAC.213 Our Destiny received much of its funding from
Governor Huntsman’s father, “a billionaire chemical executive,”
and financed a major advertising campaign to support Hunts204. See Super PACs, supra note 165.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. Michael Scherer, How Super PACs Could Eclipse Official Campaigns in
2012, TIME (Sept. 19, 2011), http://swampland.time.com/2011/09/19/how-super
-pacs-could-eclipse-official-campaigns-in-2012/; Romney Fundraiser Jumps
From Campaign to Super PAC, IWATCHNEWS (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www
.iwatchnews.org/2011/08/24/5941/romney-fundraiser-jumps-campaign-super-pac.
208. See Super PACS April 2012, supra note 203.
209. T.W. Farnam, Super PACs Let Big Donors Give Even More to Their
Candidates, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2012, at A1.
210. See Nicholas Confessore, Lines Blur Between Candidates and PACs
with Unlimited Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2011, at 1.
211. Super PACs, supra note 165.
212. See Farnam, supra note 209.
213. See Alexander Burns, Huntsman Corporation Insider Launches PAC,
POLITICO (Aug. 29, 2011, 3:09 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0811/
62256.html.
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man’s New Hampshire primary effort.214 Our Destiny had
spent more than $2.8 million by the day Governor Huntsman
ended his campaign.215 Winning Our Future, the Super PAC
created to back former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich,216
raised nearly $19 million and spent nearly $17 million217 The
pro-Rick Santorum Red White and Blue Fund had spent nearly
$7.5 million by the time he ended his campaign.218 President
Obama was the sole intended beneficiary of the Priorities USA
PAC, which was founded by two former White House aides.219
Other Super PACs were formed to back Ron Paul, Newt Gingrich, Herman Cain, and Michele Bachman.221 As one Republican operative presciently forecasted early in the campaign season, in addition to a candidate’s authorized campaign
committee “everybody will have a [Super PAC]—there will be a
sidecar for every motorcycle.”222
Nor were presidential candidates the only election participants to be benefited, or challenged, by highly targeted Super
PACs. The congressional leaderships of both parties organized
and solicited funds for Super PACs aimed at electing or reelecting members of Congress.223 In the House, for example, a former top aide to Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R.-Va.) started
the YG (for “Young Guns”) Action Fund with the goal of raising
and spending $30 million to help the Republicans retain control
214. See Jim Rutenberg & Nicholas Confessore, Major Ad Blitz for Huntsman in New Hampshire, by Group Backed by His Father, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2011, at A18; Jim Rutenberg, Huntsman Campaign, Low on Cash, Gets Aid
From Group Tied to Father, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2011, at A24.
215

See Super PACs April 2012, supra 203.

216. See Jeff Zeleny, Former Gingrich Aide Joins Pro-Newt ‘Super PAC,’ N.Y.
TIMES—THE CAUCUS (Dec. 20, 2011, 10:34 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes
.com/2011/12/20/former-gingrich-aide-joins-super-pac/?scp=1&sq=super%20pac&
st=cse.
217

See Super PACs April 2012, supra 203

218

Id.

219. See Matea Gold & Christi Parsons, Former Obama Aides May Start
Political Group, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2011, at A9.
221. See Super PACs, supra note 165.
222. Melanie Mason, Jon Huntsman Latest Hopeful to Be Backed by ‘Super
PAC,’ L.A. TIMES—POLITICS NOW (Aug. 30, 2011, 12:26 PM), http://www
.latimes.com/news/politics/la-pn-huntsman-super-pac-20110830,0,594503.story.
223. See Laura Litvan, Super-PACs Ramp Up Spending on Races Where
Control of Congress Is at Stake,
BLOOMBERG,
Mar. 8, 2012,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-08/super-pacs-ramp-up-spendingwith-congressional-control-at-stake.html; Robin Bravender & Anna Palmer,
Lawmakers Unsure Super PAC Cash Will Trickle Down, POLITICO (Oct. 14,
2011,
12:38
AM),
http://www
.politico.com/news/stories/1011/65937.html.
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of the House this fall.224 Other members of Congress and ideological groups have also been active in creating or using Super
PACs for Congressional races.225 Candidate-specific Super
PACs have also been created to back Senator Orrin Hatch (R.Utah) and Rep. Howard Berman (D.-Cal.) and to oppose Senators Scott Brown (R.-Mass.), Sherrod Brown (D.-Ohio), and
Thomas Carper (D.-Del.).226 By early January, Super PACs
were already looming so large in the Massachusetts Senate
race that Senator Brown and his prospective Democratic opponent Elizabeth Warren were discussing ways of limiting their
role.227 One seasoned Capitol Hill observer predicted that “[i]t’s
only a matter of time before super PACs become,
like . . . leadership PACs de rigueur for Members of the House
and Senate.”228
With no limits on the donations it can accept, a Super PAC
focused on a specific candidate is the perfect vehicle for donors
who want to support the candidate, but who have “maxed out,”
that is, have hit the statutory ceiling on how much they can
contribute to the candidate’s authorized campaign committee.
One study found that of the 205 individuals who donated to the
pro-Romney Restore Our Future Super PAC in 2011, 172, or
84% of the total, had also contributed the maximum amount allowed by law to Romney’s campaign.230 Five of these “maxed
224. See Hamburger & Mason, supra note 4, at A14.
225

See Jonathan Allen and Anna Palmer, Super PAC challenge: Congress,
POLITICO. Mar. 11, 2012,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/73866.html; Eliza Newlin Carney, Super PACs Target Congressional Races, ROLL CALL, Mar. 50, 2012,
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57_103/Super-PACS-Target-CongressionalRaces-212830-1.html.
226. See Eliza Newlin Carney, Super PACs Multiply, Head to Hill, ROLL
CALL, Oct. 18, 2011, at 3, 14; Dan Eggen, Congressional Incumbents Start Attracting Big-Money ‘Super PACs,” WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2011, at A23.
227. See Raju, supra note 4.
228. Carney, supra note 226, at 14. Super PACs are now also becoming
active in state elections, including state judicial races. See, e.g., Brady Dennis,
Super PACs, donors turn sights on judicial branch, Wash. Post, Mar. 29, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/super-pacs-donors-turnsights-on-judicial-branch/2012/03/29/gIQAaIsnjS_story.html; Matt Sledge, Super PAC Sugar Daddies Spread Campaign Contributions Around at State Level
Too,
Huffington
Post,
Mar.
13,
2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/13/super-pac-donors-campaigncontributions-states_n_1324229.html.
230. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Double-Duty Donors, Part II: Large
Numbers of Wealthy Donors Hit Legal Limit on Giving to Candidates, Turn to
Presidential SuperPACs in Continuing Trend, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Feb. 21,
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out” donors each gave $1 million to Restore Our Future.231 Similarly, more than one-quarter of the donors to the pro-Obama
Super PAC, Priorities USA Action, had also maxed out on their
donations to the President’s campaign committee, as had threequarters of the donors to the pro-Rick Perry Make US Great
Again, more than half the donors to Rick Santorum’s Red
White and Blue Fund, and one third of the donors to Newt Gingrich’s Winning the Future.232
Most of these donations were extremely large. As of the
end of February 2012, two-thirds of all donations to Super
PACs consisted of contributions of $500,000 or more.234 The top
ten Super PAC donors had all given in excess of $2 million
apiece, with casino magnate Sheldon Adelson, his wife and
daughter leading the pack with $16.5 million in contributions
to the pro-Gingrich Winning the Future; financier Harold
Simmons not far with $15.4 million in donations from himself,
his wife and their company to pro-Romney, pro-Gingrich, and
pro-Santorum Super PACs; and Texas homebuilder Bob Perry
having given $6.7 million to the pro-Romney Restore Our Future, a pro-Rick Perry PAC, and American Crossroads.235
The many candidate-specific Super PACs that emerged in
2011-12 played a central financing role in the opening rounds of
the Republican presidential contest. Some Super PACs apparently “spent more ad money than the candidates they support.”239 According to news accounts, by mid-December 2011
Restore Our Future spent $2.6 million in Iowa, much of it on
negative ads aimed at New Gingrich.240 The pro-Perry Super
PAC, Make Us Great Again, spent nearly $2.5 million in the
fall of 2011, while the pro-Huntsman Super PAC, Our Destiny,
spent nearly $1.9 million,241 primarily on ads in New Hamp2012, 11:00 AM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/02/double-dutydonors-part-ii-large-nu.html.
231

See id.
232. See id.

See Paul Blumenthal, Super PAC Mega-Donors Still Contributing Most of
the Money, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 23, 2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/23/super-pac-donors-500000-plusfebruary-filings_n_1376053.html.
235
See id.
234

239. Eliza Newlin Carney, Close Super PAC Ties Draw Ire, ROLL CALL,
Dec. 15, 2011, at 3.
240. See Michael D. Shear & Jeremy W. Peters, Rivals Mount Tough Attacks on Gingrich in Volatile Race, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2011, at A1.
241. See Robin Bravender & Dave Levinthal, Super PACs: The Bad Cops of
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shire242 “even as the Huntsman campaign . . . remained off the
air.”243 Overall, Super PACs, dominated by those backing Mitt
Romney, Rick Perry, and Jon Huntsman spent more than $15
million by early January 2012,244 with roughly two-thirds of
Romney’s spending in Iowa245 and South Carolina246 coming
from his Super PAC. In in the run up to Super Tuesday, Mitt
Romney’s campaign focused all its broadcast ad spending on
Ohio, but his Super PAC spent $7 million on “broadcast television, cable, and radio . . . blanketing the airwaves from Idaho to
Georgia.”247 Similarly, Newt Gingrich ran no ads of his own,
but the Super PAC supporting him spent $3.7 million in seven
states.248 According to one survey, Super PACs accounted for
91% of the campaign ads broadcast in connection with the Alabama and Mississippi Republican presidential primaries.249
During the most intense phase of the Republican nominating contest, news accounts repeatedly found that Super PAC
spending was comparably to, if not greater than, spending by
the candidates’ own campaign committees.250 By early April,
2012, POLITICO (Dec. 21, 2011, 4:32 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/
stories/1211/70731.html.
242. See Steve Peoples, Super PAC Funds Boost Huntsman Run in N.H.,
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2011, at A6.
243. Carney, supra note 239.
244. See Eggen, supra note 3.
245. See id.
246. Hamburger & Mason, supra note 4, at A14.

See Jeremy W. Peters, ‘Super PACs,’ Not Campaigns, Do Bulk of Ad
Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/03/us/politics/super-pacs-not-campaignsdo-bulk-of-adspending.html?_r=1&scp=16&sq=jeremy%20peters%20super%20pacs&st=cse.
248
See id.
249
See Greg Giroux, Super-PAC Ads Dominate Republican Race in Alabama, Mississippi, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 13, 2012,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-12/super-pacs-dominaterepublican-ads-aired-in-alabama-mississippi-primaries.html.
250
See, e.g., Jack Gillum, Super PAC Overtaking Campaign Fundraising,
HUFFINGTON POST, FEB, 21, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/21/super-pacsrepublican-gop-campaign-2012_n_1290442.html; Nicholas Confessore, G.O.P. Campaigns
Grow More Dependent on ‘Super PAC’ Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/us/politics/super-pac-role-grows-forrepublican-campaigns.html?pagewanted=all; Dan Eggen, Super PACs dominating Republican presidential race, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 20, 2012,
247
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Restore Our Future had spent more than $40 million, or roughly two-thirds of what the Romney campaign had spent as of the
of February. Winning the Future had spent $16.7 million, or
nearly the $19.2 million the Gingrich campaign as of the end of
February, and the pro-Santorum Red, White and Blue Fund
had spent $7.5 million, compared to the $13 million spent by
the Santorum campaign proper, as of the end of February.251 As
in 2010, Super PAC ads tend to be predominantly negative, as
illustrated by the anti-Gingrich ads aired in Iowa by Restore
Our Future and by the pro-Santorum Super PAC, Red, White &
Blue Fund.252
To be sure, in order to receive unlimited contributions, Super PACs must operate technically independently of the candidates they support.253 Indeed, in a television interview in December 2011, Governor Romney, who was the intended
beneficiary of more Super PAC spending than any other candidate, bemoaned the anti-coordination rule.254 Calling Super
PACs “a disaster,” he stressed in response to a complaint about
Restore Our Future’s negative anti-Gingrich ads, “I’m not allowed to communicate with a Super PAC in any way, shape or
form. If we coordinate in any way whatsoever, we go to the big
house.”255
However, a candidate and the candidate-specific Super
PAC supporting the candidate can establish a successful working relationship without formal coordination. The candidate
can fund-raise for the Super PAC256 and the Super PAC can
run footage of the candidate in its ads. Indeed, one candidate,
Rick Perry, used footage from his Super PAC’s ad for his own
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/super-pacs-dominating-republicanpresidential-race/2012/02/20/gIQANOaGQR_story.html.
251

The numbers in text are derived from comparing two charts on OpenSecrets.org –
the 2012 Presidential Campaign Fundraising Summary, which provides data concerning funds raised and spent by the campaign committees of the presidential candidates
as of February 29, 2012, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/index.php – with Presidential Independent Expenditures, which provides spending data as of the date examined, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/indexp.php.
252. See Bravender & Levinthal, supra note 241.
253. Id.
254. See Michael D. Shear, Romney Says ‘Super PACs’ Have Been a ‘Disaster,’ N.Y. TIMES—THE CAUCUS (Dec. 20, 2011, 2:47 PM), http://thecaucus
.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/romney-says-super-pacs-have-been-a-disaster/.
255. Id.
256

See, e.g., Kenneth P. Vogel, Rick, Newt come out for super PACs, POLITI15, 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/72948.html.
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campaign ads.257 Candidates and committees can post their
plans on Internet websites, thereby effectively sharing strategies with each other.258 Indeed, candidates and Super PACs
may turn to the same consultants for advice on direct mail
strategies, voter research, polling, and media services.259 Surrogates for the presidential candidate can meet with the staff of
and donors to the Super PAC.260 Foster Friess, the top financial
backer of the pro-Santorum Red, White, and Blue shared the
stage with Santorum when he gave his victory speech after
winning an election contest in Missouri primary.261 More generally, as Super PACs are typically run by former top aides to
the candidates, formal coordination of message or strategies between candidates and their Super PACs is unnecessary. The
two committees are likely to share common understandings of
campaign themes and campaign tactics. As Tom Cole (R.Okla.), the former chair of the National Republican Campaign
Committee—the official campaign committee of House Republicans—explained, “‘[w]hen your old consultants and your best
buddies are setting them up, you can pretty much suspect that
there’s been a lot of discussion beforehand.’”263 Or, as one former FEC commissioner put it, “people who think alike don’t
need to conspire.”264
257. See Ben Smith, Perry Ad Features SuperPAC Footage, POLITICO (Nov.
26, 2011, 7:45 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/1111/Perry_ad_
features_SuprPAC_footage.html.
258. See Bravender & Levinthal, supra note 241.

See, e.g., Kim Barker and Al Shaw, Campaign Spending Shows Political
Ties, Self-Dealing, PROPUBLICA, Mar. 28, 2012,
http://www.propublica.org/article/campaign-spending-shows-political-tiesself-dealing; Mike McIntire and Michael Luo, Fine Line Between ‘Super
PACs’ and Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/us/politics/loose-border-of-super-pacand-romney-campaign.html?pagewanted=all.
260
Michael Luo and Nicholas Confessore, Top Obama Adviser to Appear at
‘Super PAC’ Event, N.Y. TIMES, MAR. 3, 2012,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D03E3D61739F930A3575
0C0A9649D8B63&ref=michaelluo;
261
See Eliza Newlin Carney, The Super PAC Paradox, ROLL CALL, Mar. 12,
2012, http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57_107/Super-PAC-Paradox-2130211.html.
259

263. Anna Palmer & Jim Vandehei, A New Way to Buy Real Influence, PO(Oct. 24, 2011, 10:11 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/
66673.html.
LITICO
264

See Shane D’Aprile, Shop Talk: A New Era in Campaign Finance, CAMPAIGNS
Mar. 20, 2012,

AND ELECTIONS,
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IV. SUPER PACS AND THE FUTURE OF CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAW
As this Article is going to press in early 2012, it is too early
to determine for certain what impact Super PACs will have on
campaign finance in the 2012 election, let alone in the elections
to follow. However, the preliminary data indicates that Super
PACs are likely to be transformative, effectively ending the
post-Watergate era of campaign finance laws.
As enacted by Congress in the Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1974 and substantially modified by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, the post-Watergate campaign
finance regime had three basic features: (1) limits on contributions to federal candidates, to the political parties, and to political committees focused in federal elections; (2) reporting and
disclosure of contributions to and by, and expenditures by, these regulated entities; and (3) partial public funding.265 The contribution limits sought to curtail the influence of very wealthy
donors, and also continued the pre-existing prohibitions on corporate and union contributions.266 The expenditure limits on
independent spending would have curtailed circumvention of
the contribution limits to candidates,267 while the spending limits on candidates would have reduced the incentive for them to
focus on fundraising.268 The disclosure requirements were
aimed at fully informing the voters concerning the individuals
and interests that were funding campaigns.269 Public funding
was intended to alleviate the fund-raising burden for presidential candidates while also reducing their dependence on large
private contributions.270
Due to the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the expenditure
limits Congress adopted for candidates and independent committees, FECA’s contribution limits were subject to strain from
the outset. Candidates scrambled to collect the limited donations allowed to fund the unlimited spending the Supreme
Court permitted. The combination of unlimited spending and
limited contributions benefited multi-millionaire candidates
http://www.campaignsandelections.com/magazine/us-edition/314162/shop-talk-anew-era-in-campaign-finance.thtml (Robert Lenhard, quoting Gore Vidal).
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7 (1976) (per curiam).
See id. at 23–29, 35–36.
See id. at 44.
See id. at 107.
See id. at 65–67.
See id. at 94 –96.
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and provided an opportunity for fund-raising intermediaries,
such as PACs and bundlers, to aid candidates. Independent
committees also offered an important alternative for donors
subject to contribution limits to provide additional financial
support for their preferred candidates and to attempt to influence electoral outcomes. The system, strained as it was, largely
held. In the 1990s through the early 2000s, the system almost
broke as soft-money contributions to the political parties evaded statutory dollar limits and source prohibitions, and both
party-funded and outside group issue ads provided new opportunities for very wealthy donors, corporations, and unions to
pump money into the system.271 But the soft money and electioneering communications provisions of the BCRA, as sustained by the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC, to a considerable degree restored the post-Watergate era campaign
finance structure. Although outside groups like 527s and
501(c)s played a role in the 2004 and 2006 elections, they were
still relatively peripheral, and the possibility of new rules addressing those organizations was under active consideration in
both Congress and the FEC.272 The 2008 presidential election
largely abided by the post-Watergate rules, supplemented by
BCRA.
That system has now begun to come apart. The Supreme
Court initiated the process in 2007 when its decision in Federal
Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.
(“WRTL”)273 effectively eviscerated BCRA’s restrictions on electioneering communications by non-party outside groups, including corporations and labor unions.274 Indeed, much of the
work of unleashing the potential for unrestricted corporate and
union spending was actually accomplished by WRTL, not Citizens United. After WRTL, corporations, unions, and outside
groups could spend whatever they wanted on elections, provided they avoided express advocacy, or the functional equivalent
of express advocacy. However, that requirement still created
some uncertainty. Moreover, although wealthy individuals
could spend as much as they wanted on independent spending
271. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Supreme Court Reaffirms Ban on Soft
Money, Once a Powerful Factor in Political Campaigns, OPENSECRETS BLOG
(June 29, 2010, 5:13 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/ news/2010/06/supreme
-court-re-affirms-ban-on-sof.html.
272. See Briffault, supra note 19, at 950–52.
273. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
274. See Richard Briffault, WRTL II: The Sharpest Turn in Campaign Finance’s Long and Winding Road, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 101, 113–15 (2008).
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individually, if they sought to pool their funds to enhance their
impact and to engage in express advocacy they were still
blocked by FECA’s limits on contributions to political committees.275 Citizens United directly eliminated any remaining uncertainty about the legality of corporate campaign spending,
and indirectly, but at least as significantly, contributed to the
decisions of the lower courts and the FEC to eliminate the barriers to unlimited donations to political committees that engage
in express advocacy. It is possible, given Leake, EMILY’s List,
and Justice Blackmun’s CalMed concurrence that that barrier
would have come down anyway. But Citizens United provided
an impetus that led to its immediate dismantling.
Citizens United left the monetary and source limits on contributions to candidates and political parties formally intact,
but the rise of Super PACs has rendered them functionally
meaningless. Any individual who has “maxed out” on a contribution to a candidate or party, or any corporation or union
barred from giving to a candidate or party, can give without
limit to the candidate’s designated Super PAC, to one of the
large Super PACs dedicated to advancing the fortunes of a specific party, or to one of the Super PACs organized by the Republican or Democratic leaders of the House or Senate.276 In August 2011, Sheldon Adelson and his wife Miriam each gave the
Gingrich campaign for the Republican presidential nomination—the maximum $2500 per person federal law permits in
individual donations to candidates.277 Then in January 2012,
Mr. Adelson gave Winning Our Future, a Super PAC dedicated
to promoting Gingrich’s nomination campaign, $5 million——or
two thousand times more than the law allowed him to give the
candidate. Ultimately, Adelson, his wife and daughter together
gave the pro-Gingrich PAC $16.5 million.278 Multi-hundredthousand and million-dollar donations—contributions of a size
not seen since before the enactment of the 1974 campaign fi-

275. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38.
276. Cf. Maggie Haberman and Kenneth P. Vogel, Adelson Discusses $20
Million Check to Pro-Newt Gingrich Group, Denies Commitment, POLITICO
(Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1211/70501 ( last updated
Dec. 16, 2011, 5:56 AM) (discussing the multitude of Super PACs in existence
and noting that “the sheer volume of these super PACs with names that are
kind of similar” can cause confusion).
277. Id.

See Paul Blumenthal, Super PAC Mega-Donors Still Contributing Most of
the Money, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 23, 2012, supra.
278
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nance reforms—are now common.280 As of the end of February
2012, more than $100 million in Super PAC funds had come
from donors of $500,000 or more,281 with 25 individuals having
each donated $1 million or more.282 Campaign finance observers have noted that with the emergence of Super PACs, “you
make a phone call and get a million dollars.”283
Not only are campaign contributions now effectively unrestricted in amount, they are also for all practical purposes contributions to the candidates.285 To be sure, these over-sized contributions are going to committees that are technically
independent of the candidates, and are not allowed to coordinate their activities with the candidates.286 But in practice a
committee is part of the campaign of the candidate it is aiding.287 As already noted, candidates have raised funds for
“their” Super PACs and have sent their surrogates to meet with
the Super PACs and their financial supporters and the Super
PACs consistently employ former staffers of the candidates
they are backing.288 As Mitt Romney pointed out when called
on the anti-Gingrich ads aired by Restore Our Future during
the New Hampshire primary, “of course they’re former staff of
mine.”289 Moreover, there are all sorts of ways in which a candidate and the Super PAC backing him can collaborate without
coordinating.290 They can simply listen to each other’s press
conferences, watching each other’s commercials, and checking
280. See id. See also Eggen, supra note 3, at A6 (noting $1 million and
$500,000 donations to the pro-Romney Restore Our Future Super PAC and $2
million and $500,000 donations to the pro-Obama Priorities USA Action Super
PAC).

See Blumenthal, supra.
See Phil Hirschkorn, Super PAC donors by the numbers, CBS News Political Hotsheet, Mar. 22, 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_16257402073-503544/super-pac-donors-by-the-numbers/.
281
282

283. T.W. Farnam, Super PACs Alter the Dynamics of Fundraising, WASH.
POST (Jan. 8, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/super-pacs-alter
-the-dynamics-of-fundraising/2012/01/05/gIQAH3dz5P_print.html.
285. See id. (noting that Super PACs “have quickly evolved into de facto
shadow operations of the traditional campaigns”).
286. See id. (observing the existence of rules designed to prohibit direct cooperation between campaigns and their affiliated Super PAC, but doubting the
effectiveness of those rules).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Kenneth P. Vogel, Debate Shows Upper PACs’ Strength, POLITICO
(Jan. 8, 2012), www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71217.html.
290. See id. (questioning the familiarity Gingrich and Romney had with the
activities of their Super PACs).
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the same publically available poll data and focus group results.
As a result, even without actions that would trigger a finding of coordination, a Super PAC can follow the candidate’s lead
in deciding what campaign themes to stress or which audiences
to target.291 As Rick Tyler, Newt Gingrich’s former spokesman
and subsequent adviser to Winning Our Future, explained,
“[w]e’re Newt’s super PAC. We take out [sic] marching orders
through the media for Newt Gingrich . . . . I do what Newt tells
me through the media. And it’s all within the confines of the
law.”292 A spokesman for the Super PAC backing Rick Santorum made the same point, stating that, “[m]ore or less everyone
is looking at the same numbers . . . . A corollary to that is that
you can obviously see what the candidate is doing, whether it’s
on the stump or on the TV.”293 Frequently, a candidate’s ads
and those of his supportive Super PAC “sound almost exactly
the same.”294 Indeed, during one of the New Hampshire debates, both Mitt Romney and Newt Gingrich demonstrated
close familiarity with ads run—and even campaign ads not yet
aired—by their supportive Super PACs, and defended the content of the ads these ostensibly independent committees ran
from charges that the allegations in the ads were untrue or
misleading.295 Just as the Super PACs are able to follow the
signals sent by their candidates, the candidates are well aware
of what their Super PACs are doing, even as the formal independence of candidate and Super PAC enables the candidate to
distance himself from the most negative Super PAC ads.296
With the ability to raise and spend unlimited amounts and
create messages expressly advocating the election or defeat of
specific candidates, Super PACs are poised to be important
campaign finance players—if they don’t dominate the system
outright. Super PAC activity resulted in far more total media
spending in the early Republican presidential nomination con291. Id. (quoting an insider as declaring that “I have a big imagination but
I just can’t imagine that father and son don’t talk”).
292. Kenneth P. Vogel & Dave Levinthal, Newt Gingrich Suffers from Super PAC Buyer’s Remorse, POLITICO (Jan. 5, 2012, 4:31 AM), http://www
.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71097.html.
293. T.W. Farnam, PAC Ads Adding Confusion, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/super-pac-ads-addingconfusion/2012/
01/09/ gIQAJ5vsrP_story.html.
294. Id.
295. Vogel, supra note 289.
296. See id. (observing that both Gingrich and Romney claimed to be ignorant of unpopular negative ads aired by their respective Super PACs).
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tests compared with four years earlier.297 Often, the Super
PACs spend more than the candidates they are backing, and
Super PAC ads can overshadow the campaign ads of their candidates.298 In New Hampshire and South Carolina the Super
PACs backing Ron Paul and Rick Santorum “seemed to be defining the battlefield for the two candidates.”299 Super PACs
had a major impact on the unfolding of the campaign, with
heavy spending by Romney’s Restore Our Future PAC knocking Gingrich out of the polling lead he briefly enjoyed in Iowa,
while a surge in donations to the pro-Santorum and proGingrich Super PACs—especially the $5 million Adelson contribution—kept those two candidates in contention in South
Carolina and after.300 Although the early demise of the Huntsman and Perry candidacies demonstrates that even a wellfunded Super PAC is no guarantee of victory, the overall pattern of the Republican nominating contest demonstrates the
significant role Super PACs played as central vehicles for the
raising and spending of campaign money.301
With multi-million dollar contributions from donors who
maxed out on donations to candidates, de facto collaboration
with candidates, ads that echo the candidates’ own ads, and a
volume of money that outpaces the candidates, the age of Super
PACs has arrived. Super PACs have shattered the contribution
limits that have been central to the campaign finance regime
created by FECA, sustained in significant part by Buckley, and
reinforced by BCRA. The other two elements of the FECA/Buckley system—disclosure and public funding——remain
legally sound, but practically weak.

297. Farnam, supra note 283 (discussing that as of early January 2012
spending by outside groups in the Republican nomination contest was five
times the level of outside group spending in the entire Republican primary
season in 2008); see also Jeremy W. Peters, Multiplied by PACs, Ads Overwhelm the Airwaves in S.C., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2012) (showing that a week
before the South Carolina Republican primary, advertising spending was already $1.1 million more than in the entire primary four years earlier),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/16/us/politics/in-south-carolina-record-barrage
-of-political-ads.html.
298. See Peters, supra note 297 (describing outside money as an “arms
race” that is reaching a new level due to rules changes).
299. Vogel, supra note 289.
300. Nicholas Confessore & Jim Rutenberg, PACs’ Aid Allows Romney’s Rivals to Extend Race, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2012), at A14 (contending that Super
PACs have “propped up” Romney’s opponents).
301. Id.
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In Citizens United302 and Doe v. Reed,303 the Supreme
Court resoundingly endorsed disclosure.304 Citizens United, in
particular, treated disclosure as the constitutionally preferred
form of campaign finance regulation.305 However, the statutes
and regulations requiring disclosure will have to be significantly updated to reflect both Citizens United and the new candidate-specific Super PACs.306 For example, reporting schedules
will have to be revised to deal with the surge of Super PAC activity in pre-election years and in connection with early caucuses and primaries,307 and greater disclosure of the network of relationships linking Super PACs to 527s and 501(c)
organizations is necessary.308 Moreover, Citizens United and
Commonsense Ten, by making it possible for corporations to
give to Super PACs, have also opened up a new means for donors to evade disclosure.309 If a corporation gives to a trade association, which in turn contributes to a Super PAC, the Super
PAC must report the trade association’s donation, but the
sources of the trade association’s funds need not be reported.310
Additionally, an individual can create a shell corporation,
302. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913–14 (2010) (upholding application of disclosure law to corporate electioneering communication).
303. 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2819–20 (2010) (upholding application of disclosure
law to names and addresses of signers of ballot petition).
304. See generally Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL
RIGHTS J. 983, 993–99 (2011) (noting that the Roberts Court has “strongly upheld” disclosure laws).
305. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915 (declaring that “disclosure is a less
restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations of speech”).
306

See Richard Briffault Updating Disclosure for the New Era of Independent Spending, ___ J. L. & POL. ___ (2012) (forthcoming).
307. See, e.g., Keennan Steiner, Presidential Super PAC Disclosures May
Leave Voters in the Dark, SUNLIGHT FOUND. REPORTING GRP. (Dec. 22, 2011,
11:56 AM), http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/2011/presidential-superpac-disclosures-may-leave-voters-in-the-dark (observing that manipulation of
reporting schedules can allow Super PACs to “evade important campaign finance disclosure requirements”).
308. See GARRETT, supra note 2, at 25 (“[R]elationships between super
PACs and possibly related entities . . . cannot be . . . reliably established based
on current reporting requirements.”).
309. Id. (contending that Super PACs allow donors to avoid disclosure requirements).
310. Id. at 23. See also Daniel Stone, Michael Beckel, and Rachel Marcus,
Donors to conservative super PAC masked by nonprofit, iWatchNews (Center
for
Public
Integrity),
Mar.
11,
2012,
http://www.iwatchnews.org/2012/03/11/8360/donors-conservative-super-pacmasked-nonprofit.
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and contribute to the shell, which in turn contributes to the
Super PAC.311 The donation from the shell corporation will be
reported, but not the underlying individual donor.312 The possibility of such a tactic was underscored in August 2011 when reporters noted that the Romney Super PAC, Restore Our Future, had received a $1 million donation from “W Spann LLC,”
a Delaware corporation with a Manhattan address that had
been formed in March, made its contribution in April, and dissolved in July, with no apparent activity other than the donation to Restore Our Future.313 To tamp down the resulting controversy, the anonymous donor—a former official at the
investment firm Romney once headed—soon came forward.314
But that is unlikely to be the last time such a device is used to
avoid disclosure. Indeed, Super PACs have continued to report
donations from such cryptic backers as F8 LLC315 and RTTA
LLC.316 The comedian Stephen Colbert, who had already created his own Super PAC to draw attention to the Super PAC
phenomenon,317 announced he would form a shell corporation—
appropriately named “Anonymous Shell Corporation”—to provide his donors with the same opportunity.318
Thus, disclosure laws will require significant revision to
deal with the rise of Super PACs.319 And, of course, even if ef311. Id. at 23 n.49.
312. Id. at 23.
313. Michael Isikoff, Mystery Million-Dollar Romney Donor Revealed, NBC
NEWS (Aug. 6, 2011, 4:48 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44046063/
ns/politics/t/mystery-million-dollar-romney-donor-revealed//#.TzL1UvmlN2k.
314. Id.
315

Nicholas Confessore, Michael Luo, and Mike McIntire, In Republican Race, a
New Breed of Superdonor, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/us/politics/in-republican-race-a-new-breed-ofsuperdonor.html?_r=1&ref=mikemcintire.
316
Jonathan D. Salant, Payday Lender Political Donors Hidden in Corporate Names,
Bloomberg, Mar. 21, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-22/paydaylender-political-donors-hidden-in-corporate-names.html.
317. See FEC Advisory Op. Request 2011-23 (Americans for Tomorrow,
Tomorrow, Nov. 6, 2011) (detailing the mission statement and other goals of
Mr. Colbert’s Super PAC).
318. See Justin Sink, Colbert Creates Shell Corporation to Lampoon Karl
Rove’s Groups, THE HILL (Sept. 30, 2011, 9:31 AM), http://thehill.com/video/in
-the-news/184755-colbert-creates-shell-corporation-to-lampoon-rove-moneylaundering (announcing Mr. Colbert’s anonymous shell corporation).
319

For some proposed reforms to our disclosure laws that address the rise of Super
PACs and other forms of independent spending, see Richard Briffault Updating Disclosure for the New Era of Independent Spending, ___ J. L. & POL. ___ (2012)
(forthcoming).

SUPER PACs April

2012]

4/15/2012 4:18 PM

SUPER PACS

1675

fectively so revised, disclosure can do nothing to limit large donations to and spending by Super PACs.
Although last year’s decision in Arizona Free Enterprise
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett320 will make it more difficult to develop mechanisms that enable publicly funded candidates to compete with privately-funded ones or—and this is
more salient given the rise of Super PACs—to respond to hostile independent spending, public funding still remains a constitutionally viable form of campaign finance regulation.321 The
real difficulty for public funding, particularly at the federal level, is the unwillingness of legislators to offer public funds at
high enough levels to make public funding attractive to serious
candidates, as well as the failure to revise the presidential public funding program to take into account the fact that the initial
caucuses and primaries of the nomination campaign now start
much earlier than they did when public funding was first enacted.322 As a result of the weaknesses of the public funding
program, 2012 marks the first election since the enactment of
the presidential public funding program in 1974 in which not a
single serious presidential candidate is taking public funding.323 Given that the House of Representatives has just voted
to abolish public funding for presidential campaigns,324 it seems
extremely unlikely that Congress will do anything to strengthen public funding in practice, even though it remains constitutionally available in theory.
Contribution limits to candidates, too, are available in theory but dead in practice. The FEC might be able to restore
some semblance of the old order by more effectively defining
and enforcing the rules distinguishing between independent
320. 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011) (holding that Arizona’s matching funds
scheme did not survive strict scrutiny).
321. Id. at 2828 (“We do not today call into question the wisdom of public
financing as a means of funding political candidacy.”).
322. See Stephen Dinan, Federal Matching Campaign Funds Find No Major Takers, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2012/jan/8/federal-campaign-funds-find-no-candidate-takers/?page=all
(calling the public funding system “out of sync” with the timing and cost of
modern campaigns).
323. See id.
324. Ben Pershing, House Votes to End Public Funding for Presidential
Campaigns, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2011, 3:13 PM), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/blogs/2chambers/post/house-votes-to-end-public-funding-for-presidential
-campaigns/2011/12/01/gIQAc8SaHO_blog.html (reporting that the House of
Representatives voted 235 to 190 to end the funding, although the matter is
not likely to come before the Senate).
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and coordinated activity.325 For starters, that would require the
Commission to reconsider its decision to allow candidates and
officeholders to raise funds for Super PACs, and its failure to
bar Super PACs and candidates from sharing ad content and
coordinating messages. Alternatively, new rules challenging
the “independence” of committees run by former staffers of
candidates aided by those committees could be considered.
Certainly, the Commission could conclude that a candidate is
coordinating with a Super PAC when he or a member of his
campaign staff raises funds for or meets with staff to the Super
PAC. But given the current make-up of the Commission, there
is no prospect for any such action any time soon.326
More seriously, either the FEC or Congress could begin the
process of compiling the information which could demonstrate
that, large contributions that are solicited by candidates and
party leaders and given to committees run by former campaign
or party staff and dedicated to promoting the elections of specific candidates or groups of candidates raise the same dangers of
money-purchased preferential access to elected officials as the
contributions to political parties restricted by the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 and sustained in McConnell, or
on the contributions to candidates and committees that give to
candidates that were sustained in Buckley.
Like the contributors to candidates before FECA and the
major soft money donors before BCRA, the contributors to Super PACs often have significant interests that will be affected
by the decisions of the officials whose elections they are trying
to influence. Many Super PAC donors are actively engaged in
lobbying over a wide range of tax, regulatory, and other legislative issues.328 Individuals, firms, trade associations, and unions
interested in such questions as the tax treatment of hedge fund
income, the eligibility of students attending for-profit colleges
for federal financial assistance, defense contracts, and the regulation of payday lending have all been major donors to Super
PACs.329 Other leading Super PAC donors have comparably in325. GARRETT, supra note 2, at 24.
326. Id. at 23–24.
328

See Alexander Bolton, Romney and Obama super-PAC backers also spent big dollars on lobbying, THE HILL, Feb. 25, 2012.
329
See, e.g., Salant, supra, Payday Lenders; Michael Scherer, When Obama Regulates, Companies Retaliate with Donations to Romney Super PAC, TIME, Mar. 22,
2012, http://swampland.time.com/2012/03/22/when-obama-regulates-companiesretaliate-with-donations-to-romney-super-pac/; Ian Duncan & Matea Gold, Federal
contractors donate to ‘super PAC’ backing Romney, L.A. Times, Mar. 18, 2012,
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tense in ideological or foreign policy issues.330 The prospect of
obtaining the benefit of extremely large – and legally unlimited
– donations to an allied Super PAC and of avoiding the costs of
having an unlimited amount of hostile Super PAC spending
against you is at least as likely to affect the legislative, regulatory, and appointments decisions of elected officials as the relatively paltry amounts that candidates’ personal campaign
committees are allowed to receive. And surely the demoralizing
effects on voters “stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual
financial contributions” that so concerned the Supreme Court
in Buckley331 and has since become known as the “appearance
of corruption” justification for the regulation of contributions is
just as likely to result from the multi-hundred-thousand and
multi-million dollar donations to Super PACs as from contributions to candidates and political parties.
At present there is little prospect of the FEC or Congress
assessing the improper influence and appearance of corruption
effects of unlimited donations to Super PACs, and taking action
either to limit Super PAC contributions or even to force a
greater separation of Super PACs from the candidates they are
backing. Even if such a law were to be enacted, it is doubtful
whether it would pass constitutional muster with the current
Supreme Court, which, unless it now agrees with Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer that “Montana’s experience, and experience
elsewhere since this Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. ___ (2010), make it exceedingly difficult to maintain that independent expenditures by corporations ‘do
not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.’”333

would have to be persuaded that at least in some circumstances
donations to independent committees can be limited even if
http://swampland.time.com/2012/03/22/when-obama-regulates-companies-retaliatewith-donations-to-romney-super-pac/; Kevin Bogardus & Rachel Levin, Super-PACs
a new tool in trade groups’ 2012 election arsenal, The Hill, Mar. 7, 2012,
http://swampland.time.com/2012/03/22/when-obama-regulates-companies-retaliatewith-donations-to-romney-super-pac/; Dan Froomkin, Mitt Romney Super PAC’s Big
Donors Could Reap Many Dividends, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 1, 2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/01/mitt-romney-super-pac-bigdonors_n_1306868.html.
330
See, e.g., Kenneth P. Vogel, Campaigns can push mega donors’ pet causes?, POLITICO, Mar. 2, 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/73518.html.
331
424 U.S. at 27.
333
American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, 132 S.Ct. 1307 (Feb. 17, 2012)
(statement respecting grant of the application for stay).
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spending by such committees cannot be.
CONCLUSION
More than a century after Congress enacted the first restrictions on contributions in federal elections, and thirty-eight
years after the comprehensive post-Watergate contribution limits were adopted, we appear to be rapidly heading into an era in
which those contribution limits have been rendered functionally meaningless. We shall soon find out what this means for our
campaign finance system, our elections, and our politics.

